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Abstract—We use Delay-Tolerant Networking (DTN) to 
break control loops between space-ground communication 
links and ground-ground communication links to increase 
overall file delivery efficiency, as well as to enable large files to 
be proactively fragmented and received across multiple ground 
stations. DTN proactive fragmentation and reactive 
fragmentation were demonstrated from the UK-DMC satellite 
using two independent ground stations. The files were 
reassembled at a bundle agent, located at Glenn Research 
Center in Cleveland Ohio. The first space-based demonstration 
of this occurred on September 30 and October 1, 2009. This 
paper details those experiments. 
 
Index Terms—Communication, delay-tolerant networking, 
DTN, satellite, Internet, protocols, bundle, IP, TCP. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ASA’S Earth Science Technology Office (ESTO) is 
interested in automating terrestrial and space-based 
sensor webs, as well as in developing technologies which 
allow sensor webs to interact autonomously and improve 
access to sensor data. NASA Glenn Research Center has 
performed research related to secure, autonomous, integrated 
space/ground sensor webs.  
The overall goal of the secure autonomous integrated 
space/ground sensor web project was to demonstrate secure 
coordinated network-centric operations of space/ground 
assets owned and operated by multiple parties. In order to 
accomplish this, a network consisting of terrestrial sensors 
(seismic sensors), a Virtual Mission Operations Center 
(VMOC), multiple ground stations and a spacecraft were 
used. The concept of operation is illustrated in Figure 1. A 
seismic sensor update is received by the VMOC that indicates 
the location of some exceptional event of interest. The 
VMOC then decides what other sensors or sensor networks 
can be brought to bear in order to gain more information on 
that event. In this situation, the terrestrial sensor web is the 
Global Seismic Network, with trigger information obtained 
from the United States Geological Survey (USGS).  
 
Figure 1 shows the overall concept of operations (CONOPS) 
as a series of events, labeled 1 through 7. 
 
1) The VMOC receives a trigger of a seismic event from the 
USGS notification system, setting the autonomous sensor 
web into motion. 
2) The VMOC’s job is to task other sensors and reserve 
and/or configure whatever infrastructure is necessary to 
obtain the requested data. In this instance, the other sensor 
is the United Kingdom Disaster Monitoring Constellation 
(UK-DMC) satellite, built and operated by Surrey Satellite 
Technology Limited (SSTL). The supporting infrastructure 
includes Internet-enabled ground stations.  
3) Once the VMOC coordinates all facilities for availability 
and requests reservation of those assets, the individual 
entities cooperate to configure and operate their facilities 
and infrastructure to provide functionality and capabilities, 
rather than the VMOC assuming complete control. 
4) Commands are sent to the spacecraft regarding when to 
capture sensor data and when to transmit that data to the 
ground. Those commands are currently passed to the 
satellite via SSTL’s ‘home’ ground station; however, they 
could conceivably be passed to the satellite via a third-
party ground station, such as one of the other international 
DMC ground stations, or the Australian station of 
Universal Space Network (USN), as shown in Figure 1. 
5) The remote-sensing image is taken over the area of interest 
corresponding to the seismic event. 
6) The image is then downloaded. Figure 1 shows this image 
being downloaded to a third party ground station in Japan. 
7) If an image is too large to be transmitted in its entirety 
during a single pass, the remaining portion of the file can 
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be transmitted via a second ground terminal. In Figure 1, 
the second ground station is at USN’s site in Alaska.  
A limited demonstration of the overall concept occurred in 
July 2009 [1] [2]. This paper describes a later demonstration 
of large-file transfer over multiple ground stations, 
corresponding to steps 6 and 7, in September and October of 
2009. These tests were successfully performed using the 
network shown in Figure 2.  
II. STORE-AND-FORWARD PROTOCOL 
In order to perform large file transfers, using multiple 
independent ground stations, it was necessary to utilize store-
and-forward technologies to break control loops across the 
end-to-end path into separate consecutive space-ground and 
ground-ground control loops. This increased download 
efficiency across each link. 
These tests were performed using the UK-DMC satellite. 
The UK-DMC communication system uses a slow 9600 bits-
per-second (bps) uplink for commanding and the much faster 
8.134 Mbps dedicated downlink for transmitting high-
resolution imagery. Any ground-to-ground communication is 
over the open, shared, congested Internet, and could have 
effective throughput of 10s of kbps to 10s of Mbps with no 
guarantees. It is imperative that the downlink be fully utilized 
so that as much data is transferred from the satellite as 
possible during a minutes-long pass over a ground station. 
By implementing store-and-forward techniques, we can 
break the communication control loops from space-to-ground 
and ground-to-ground and choose optimal transport protocols 
for each link to increase delivery throughput. For these 
experiments, the experimental Delay-Tolerant Networking 
(DTN) “bundle protocol” was used as the store-and-forward 
protocol [3] [4]. The Saratoga transport protocol [5] [6] [7] 
was used to optimize data transfer of bundles from space to 
ground across the private space link, while the widespread 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) was used as the 
“bundle convergence layer” for ground-to-ground data 
transfer across the public, shared, Internet. 
III. LARGE FILE TRANSFERS VIA A SINGLE GROUND 
TERMINAL  
On August 27 and 28 of 2008, large file transfer 
experiments were performed using DTN proactive 
fragmentation and two satellite passes over a single ground 
station at SSTL in Guildford, United Kingdom [4]. The two 
passes emulated use of multiple independent ground 
terminals. Following those tests, work progressed to establish 
infrastructure required to perform the same tests over 
multiple ground stations [Figure 2]. In July of 2009, that 
infrastructure was completed and tested. There now were 
sufficient ground stations and corresponding DTN bundle 
agent nodes available to be able to perform multi-terminal 
testing. The DTN bundling-capable ground stations were at 
Guildford, England, as before, and at stations in Alaska, 
Hawaii and Australia (operated by Universal Space 
Network). Work also progressed to include a ground station 
in Koganei, Japan, operated by the National Institute of 
Communication Technology (NICT) of Japan. The US 
Army’s Tactical Ground Station, in Colorado Springs, was 
removed from this network, due to changes in their 
operational priorities.  
IV. LARGE FILE TRANSFERS VIA MULTIPLE INDEPENDENT 
GROUND TERMINALS 
On September 30 and October 1, 2009, successful 
demonstrations of DTN proactive fragmentation and, by 
accident, reactive fragmentation using two independent 
ground stations, occurred. Proactive fragmented bundles were 
received at ground stations in Alaska and Hawaii and 
reassembled at a bundle agent at NASA Glenn Research 
Center in Cleveland, Ohio [Figure 3]. 
A. Test Details 
The UK-DMC satellite passed over USN ground stations 
in Alaska and Hawaii. The first pass was over Alaska and the 
second pass over Hawaii, about 73 minutes later. 
The onboard Solid State Data Recorder (SSDR) computer, 
storing the remote sensing image taken by the onboard 
cameras in its RAM, had to remain powered on during 
eclipse (dark night), but all transmissions were made during 
daylight to put as little strain on the satellite power system 
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and onboard battery as possible. 
Images of 150 Mbytes in size were captured and 
proactively fragmented into 80-Mbyte and 70-Mbyte bundles.  
Creating a large 150-Mbyte file enabled demonstration of 
proactive fragmentation, but also provided sufficient time 
during a pass to also download the entire file using non-DTN 
techniques for comparison. It also allowed some time for 
recovery from human operating error. 
Note, SSTL image files are often up to nearly a Gbyte on 
the UK-DMC satellite, and are much larger on SSTL’s newer 
satellites with higher-resolution imagers [4].  
B. Choosing a Satellite Pass 
For these experiments, modeling in the Satellite Took Kit 
(STK) was used to select potential passes for the UK-DMC 
satellite over Alaska and Hawaii [Figure 4]. In order to 
conserve the satellite batteries, all passes are in daylight. 
Conveniently, a high elevation pass over Alaska will result in 
a high elevation pass over Hawaii approximately 1 orbit later. 
The colored lines in figure 4 show the line-of-sight contact 
time over the ground stations of interest when in view of the 
satellite and when in daylight.  
Once a potential pass is identified, the USN ground station 
schedule is evaluated for availability. If USN can meet the 
pass times, a request is put in to reserve the ground station at 
the appropriate UTC times [Table 1]. If that request is 
accepted, a request for services is sent to SSTL. SSTL then 
evaluates the request against its commitments, and either 
validates the requests, or indicates that such a request cannot 
be met due to previous commitments or insufficient satellite 
resources (e.g. low battery levels, unavailable on board 
storage due to other imaging commitments). If SSTL cannot 
meet the request, the process is then started from the 
beginning, with a request for available ground station time 
preceding a request for available satellite time. This is done 
in that order as the confirmation for ground station time is 
currently much quicker, being performed via email, with 
updated operations schedules also automatically being sent 
via email. 
USN asset reservations can also be quickly cancelled via 
email. Current scheduling of SSTL’s assets is performed 
manually. Thus, there is a mix of manual processes and 
automation for scheduling assets. Eventually, this scheduling 
will be fully automated [1].  
On both September 30th and October 1st, 2009, NASA was 
able to successfully schedule all needed ground and space 
assets for testing and request image capture. Since the actual 
image content was not of importance for these large-file tests, 
just the size, the image was taken just prior to the 1st pass. 
C. Multi-Terminal Testing – September 30, 2009 
On September 30, 2009, the following commands were 
issued to the UK-DMC satellite: 
• 150 Mbyte image capture at 17:00:21 UTC 
• MD5 file checksum hash command at 17:02:02 UTC  
• Downlink 1 - 17:11:00 to 17:24:00 (Full downlink 
duration scheduled, eclipse starts at 17:30 UTC) 
• Downlink 2 - 18:37:30 to 18:50:30 
 
NASA had previously added functionality to SSTL’s 
operational code, including creation of bundles for the first 
Interplanetary Internet tests in space [4], and a command to 
check file integrity. SSTL does not use checks of entire file  
integrity in their normal operations, as these take some time 
to run, and processing of image data (orthorectification, 
calibration) will expose errors. Instead, a strong HDLC frame 
CRC across each IP packet, coupled with SSTL’s Saratoga 
transport protocol to resend data, provides sufficient 
reliability for SSTL’s needs. NASA added an optional MD5 
hash command to enable checking of the reconstructed 
downloaded file, generated from bundle fragments, against 
the original onboard file. 
 The test plan and procedures for 30 Sept 2009 were 
performed in the following order: 
 
 Order of tests for Pass 1 over Alaska: 
1) Download the System Log File, Syslog, and check the 
MD5 checksum 
2) Download Proactive Fragment #1 (DTN proactive 
Fragmentation) 
3) Download File using GRC Saratoga 
4) Download Syslog again 
5) Check that bundle fragment #1 is transferred to Bundle 
Master (the NASA Glenn Bundle Agent that is the 
destination and reassembly point) 
6) Check that fragment #1 was received by Bundle 
Master. 
 
As there are approximately 70 minutes between the Alaska 
pass and the Hawaii pass, there is sufficient time to 
validate reception of bundle fragment #1. 
 
  
Table 1 – USN Request for Service 
UKDMC,USAK01,Add,9/30/2009,273,17:11:00,9/30/2009,273,17:24:00
,0:13:00,High Rate Pass access SSDR 
UKDMC,USHI01,Add,9/30/2009,273,18:37:30,9/30/2009,273,18:50:30,
0:13:00,High Rate Pass access SSDR 
UKDMC,USAK01,Add,10/1/2009,274,17:49:00,10/1/2009,274,18:02:00
,0:13:00,High Rate Pass access SSDR 
UKDMC,USHI01,Add,10/1/2009,274,19:14:00,10/1/2009,274,19:27:00,
0:13:00,High Rate Pass access SSDR 
Figure 4 – Plot of Satellite Passes over Ground Stations 
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Order of tests for Pass 2 over Hawaii: 
1) Download Syslog 
2) Download Fragment #2 (DTN proactive 
Fragmentation) 
3) Download File using GRC Saratoga 
4) Download Syslog again 
5) Check that bundle fragment #2 was transferred to 
Bundle Master and confirm that fragment #2 was 
received by Bundle Master.  
6) Check the MD5 calculation of the recombined file to 
confirm accurate successful reception. 
 
During the pass over Alaska, the results showed a 
successful download of the Syslog, of the 80 Mbyte fragment 
(fragment #1) and the entire non-bundle 150 Mbyte file. 
There was also a successful download of the Syslog file, the 
70 Mbyte fragment (fragment #2) and the entire 150 Mbyte 
non-bundle file over Hawaii.  
Oddly, no bundles from Alaska or Hawaii were received at 
the NASA Glenn bundle agent destination, designated the 
Bundle Master. During the earlier single terminal test of 
August 2008 this problem had not been observed [4]. Upon 
investigation, a DTN routing problem was discovered. In the 
2008 single terminal tests, there was a default route in the 
DTN2 configuration file at the ground station in Guildford, 
England (i.e. dtn://*). That default route had been removed 
from both the Alaska and Hawaii bundle agents. Thus, the 
bundles were sitting at Hawaii and Alaska awaiting a route. 
Due to a typographic error, a proper route was not available. 
The route in the bundle Alaska and Hawaii bundle agents 
was: 
link add link_grc1 bundling1:4556 ONDEMAND tcp 
route add dtn://bundling-grc1/* link_grc1 
However, the Endpoint Identifier (EID) of the Bundle 
created onboard the UK-DMC satellite was dtn:bundling-
grc1. Note, there are no forward slashes in the onboard EID, 
but there were forward slashes in the ground station bundle 
forwarding nodes (i.e. dtn://bundling-grc1). To clarify: 
dtn://bundling-grc1/* was the initial route configuration on 
30 Sept 2009 and this didn't work as expected. The bundles 
that were not being forwarded were addressed to the different 
dtn:bundling-grc1. In 2008, with the default route in the 
SSTL ground station bundle forwarding agent, the bundle 
was forwarded properly. With no default routes, the bundle 
fragments at Alaska and Hawaii were simply being stored 
until a valid route would become available or the bundle 
would expire.  
It is important to note that the bundles were created with a 
lifetime of 3 days. Thus, the received bundle fragments were 
not in danger of expiring during these experiments. 
 
Examination of the DTN2 status showed: 
In Alaska: 
Currently Pending Bundles (1):  
 11503: dtn:uk-dmc/i -> dtn:bundling-grc1/i length 
80000000 
In Hawaii: 
Currently Pending Bundles (1):  
 26558: dtn:uk-dmc/i -> dtn:bundling-grc1/i length 
77260545 
The following route was added in both the Alaska and 
Hawaii bundle agents: 
route add dtn:bundling-grc1/* link_grc1  
Technically, this should not have matched either route, or, if 
the slashes do not matter, then it should have matched both. 
The fact that the route matched one, but not the other, is 
logically inconsistent. Thus, there appears to be a parsing bug 
in the implementation of the DTN2 bundle software used 
(version 2.3.0). 
The route in Alaska was added first, and forwarding of 
proactive bundle fragment #1 began. We receive bundle 
fragment #1 from Alaska at GRC “bundle master”: 
bundling-grc dtn% bundle list 
Currently Pending Bundles ... :  
154400: dtn:uk-dmc/i -> dtn:bundling-grc1/i length 
80000000 
 
Examining the information at the NASA DTN2 destination 
bundle agent from source uk-dmc showed that a full proactive 
bundle fragment was received. 
dtn% bundle info 154402 
bundle id 154402: 
source: dtn:uk-dmc/i 
dest: dtn:bundling-grc1/i 
custodian: dtn:none 
replyto: dtn:none 
prevhop:  
payload_length: 33128366 
priority: 0 
custody_requested: false 
app_acked_rcpt: false 
creation_ts: 307602048.0 
expiration: 604800 
is_fragment: true 
is_admin: false 
do_not_fragment: true 
orig_length: 157260545 
frag_offset: 80000000 
transmission_count: 0 
 
Examining the bundles at the Hawaii Bundle agent showed 
a proactive bundle fragment of 77260545 bytes pending, due 
to no current route being available. 
localhost dtn% route dump bundle list 
Currently Pending Bundles (1):  
 26558: dtn:uk-dmc/i -> dtn:bundling-grc1/i length 
77260545 
A route was added to the Hawaii bundling agent: 
 localhost dtn% route add dtn:bundling-grc1/* link_grc1 
and forwarding is established. During forwarding, an 
interesting turn of events occurred. While monitoring 
incoming packets at the NASA Glenn bundle master 
(bundling-grc1), it became evident that the TCP connection 
slowed, stopped and restarted. This happened three times, 
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resulting in three REACTIVE fragments of our 77 Mbyte 
proactive fragment. This reactive fragmentation was 
documented in the Hawaii log file captured during our 
“putty” sessions [8]. The following shows for the second 
reactive fragment: 
localhost dtn% bundle list 
Currently Pending Bundles (1):  
 26558: dtn:uk-dmc/i -> dtn:bundling-grc1/i length 
77260545 
localhost dtn% [1254339449.785320 /dtn/bundle/daemon 
warning] event BUNDLE_RECEIVED took 2338 ms to 
process 
localhost dtn% bundle list 
Currently Pending Bundles (1):  
 26559: dtn:uk-dmc/i -> dtn:bundling-grc1/i length 
44136275 
localhost dtn% bundle info 
wrong number of arguments to 'bundle info' expected 3, 
got 2 while evaluating {bundle info} 
localhost dtn% bundle info list 
Currently Pending Bundles (1):  
 26559: dtn:uk-dmc/i -> dtn:bundling-grc1/i length 
44136275 
localhost dtn% bundle list info 26559 
bundle id 26559: 
source: dtn:uk-dmc/i 
dest: dtn:bundling-grc1/i 
custodian: dtn:none 
replyto: dtn:none 
prevhop:  
payload_length: 44136275 
priority: 0 
custody_requested: false 
.... all false .... 
do_not_fragment: false 
orig_length: 157260545 
frag_offset: 113124270 
transmission_count: 0 
 
The following bundle fragments were received at the 
bundle master destination (bundling-grc1) and awaited 
processing: 
Currently Pending Bundles ... :  
154400: dtn:uk-dmc/i -> dtn:bundling-grc1/i length 
80000000 
154402: dtn:uk-dmc/i -> dtn:bundling-grc1/i length 
33128366 
154403: dtn:uk-dmc/i -> dtn:bundling-grc1/i length 
42758078 
154404: dtn:uk-dmc/i -> dtn:bundling-grc1/i length 
1382309 
At the bundle recombining destination, there was an 80-
Mbyte proactive bundle fragment #1 from Alaska and a 70- 
Mbyte proactive fragment #2 from Hawaii, but the 70-Mbyte 
proactive fragment #2 was received in three reactive 
fragments of 33.1 Mbytes, 42.8 Mbytes and 1.3 Mbytes, as 
shown in Figure 3. 
The bundle fragments were recombined using a NASA file 
recombining script, dtnrecv.  
dtnrecv -n 1 -O $1 dtn:bundling-grc1/i 
An MD5 hash was then calculated for the recombined 
received file, and validated against the original MD5 
calculation performed onboard the UK-DMC satellite to 
ensure that the fragments were reassembled and the bundle 
was received correctly. The results show a perfect match.  
 From the Spacecraft Syslog file: 
<14>syslog[17:02:02+052 30/09/2009]: looking for files 
in /home to run MD5 on 
<14>syslog[17:02:02+054 30/09/2009]:  syslog.txt 
<14>syslog[17:02:02+055 30/09/2009]:  tmp 
<14>syslog[17:02:02+056 30/09/2009]:  DU000999pm 
<14>syslog[17:02:02+058 30/09/2009]: running MD5 on 
/home/DU000999pm 
<14>syslog[17:07:27+028 30/09/2009]: MD5 of 
DU000999pm : 0x6964a515 , 0xf7672d18, 
0x7a89ee21, 0xce7aeab7 
At GRC BundleMaster: 
[weddy@Bundle-Master Sep302009_multiterminal_AK-
HI_pass]$ md5sum DU000999pm_bak 
6964a515f7672d187a89ee21ce7aeab7 DU000999pm_bak 
D. Multi-Terminal Testing – October 1, 2009 
 On Thursday, October 1, 2009, a nearly-identical test to 
that of September 30th was executed. However, since the 
September 30th test was fully successful, a slight modification 
was performed. For the Alaska pass, fragment #2, the 70-
Mbyte proactive fragment, was downloaded. During the 
second pass over Hawaii, the first, 80-Mbyte, bundle 
fragment was downloaded. Since the proper routes were now 
in place, these bundle fragments were forwarded as soon as 
they were received at the ground stations, without being 
delayed due to not having a known route to destination.  
On October 1, 2009, the following commands were 
issued to the UK-DMC satellite: 
• 150 Mbyte Image capture at 17:30:21 UTC 
• MD5 Command at 17:32:02 UTC 
• Downlink 1 - 17:49:00 to 18:02:00 (Full downlink 
duration scheduled, eclipse starts at 18:08 UTC) 
• Downlink 2 - 19:14:00 to 19:27:00 
 
Order of tests for Pass 1 over Alaska: 
1) Download the System Log File, Syslog, and check the 
MD5 checksum 
2) Download proactive fragment #2 (DTN proactive 
fragmentation) 
3) Download file using NASA Glenn Saratoga 
4) Download Syslog again 
 
Order of tests for Pass 2 over Hawaii: 
1) Download Syslog 
2) Download fragment #1 (DTN proactive 
Fragmentation) 
3) Download file using NASA Glenn Saratoga 
4) Download Syslog again 
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As with the 30 September tests, successful download 
occurred at both ground stations. The Syslog file was 
downloaded multiple times at each ground station, and the 
proactive fragments were downloaded once, as was the entire 
file without bundling for a comparison check. 
The TCP connection between Hawaii and GRC again 
timed out. This time-out only occurred once, resulting in two 
reactive fragments. The proactive and reactive fragments 
were reassembled, and the file MD5 calculation matched that 
onboard the spacecraft. 
From the perspective of the bundle destination, NASA 
Glenn BundleMaster (bundling-grc1), the following bundles 
fragments were received and awaited processing: 
bundling-grc dtn% bundle list 
Currently Pending Bundles (3):  
156002: dtn:uk-dmc/i -> dtn:bundling-grc1/i length 
77260545 
156003: dtn:uk-dmc/i -> dtn:bundling-grc1/i length 
12320689 
156004: dtn:uk-dmc/i -> dtn:bundling-grc1/i length 
67683407 
From the Spacecraft Syslog File: 
<14>syslog[17:32:02+075 01/10/2009]:  DU000998pm 
<14>syslog[17:32:02+076 01/10/2009]: running MD5 on 
/home/DU000998pm 
<14>syslog[17:37:27+054 01/10/2009]: MD5 of 
DU000998pm : 0x55e1a3d4 , 0xb0906b00, 
0xd95084bf, 0x1353ec50 
At GRC BundleMaster: 
[weddy@Bundle-Master Oct012009_multiterminal_AK-
HI_pass]$ md5sum Oct012009_multiterminal_ak-hi_img 
55e1a3d4b0906b00d95084bf1353ec50  
E.  Reactive Fragmentation  
We did not determine why the TCP connection from USN 
Hawaii to NASA Glenn in Cleveland was timing out. 
However, these time-outs led to a demonstration of reactive 
fragmentation – albeit unintentionally and by accident. 
Without support for reactive fragmentation and reassembly, 
these tests would not have been successful. Being able to 
handle reactive fragmentation is, at least in this case, highly 
desirable.  
If  the bundle security protocol (BSP) bundle 
authentication block (BAB) [9] or the payload integrity block 
(PIB) [10] had been used, these separate fragments would 
have been discarded at the receiving bundle master due to 
failure of the authentication or integrity checks. It is worth re-
examining how authentication and reliability are performed – 
particularly with regard to implementation policy. It may be 
possible to implement either in a manner whereby one can 
reconstruct the fragments hop-by-hop so long as the 
fragments follow the same path.  
V. CONCLUSION 
DTN bundle protocols were used to break control loops 
between space-ground communication links and ground-
ground communication links to increase efficiency of file 
delivery, as well as to enable large files to be proactively 
fragmented and received at two independent ground stations. 
Without reactive fragmentation, these tests would not have 
been successful. Reactive fragmentation is unable to operate 
successfully using current implementations of bundle 
authentication and reliability. Application of authentication 
and implementation of authentication and reliability design 
and policy should be reconsidered to enable use with reactive 
fragmentation. 
The DTN2 implementation holds onto bundles until valid 
routes or a default route are available, or until the bundle 
expires. If bundles were removed due to no available route, 
even though the lifetime had not expired, the tests would 
have failed. It is highly recommended that bundles only be 
removed once they expire, as valid routes may become 
available during the lifetime of the bundle, even if those 
routes do not initially exist.  
During testing, the extensive logging and reporting 
capabilities of the DTN2 bundling implementation proved 
invaluable. Such logging and reporting capabilities should be 
encouraged for other DTN implementations. 
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